

De la Cruz, Leland Joseph, Germelino Bautista, Antonio Pangilinan, and Angela Desiree Aguirre. Institutional and Organizational Assessment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. CARP Impact Assessment Studies, Volume 8. Department of Agrarian Reform, Diliman, Quezon City, 2003.

The study aimed to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall institutional structure involved in CARP implementation. The findings were based on qualitative statistical analysis, a review of related literature, field research and interviews with key informants. On external institutional environment of CARP implementation, the major findings are: a) extremely porous legal environment of the CARP; b) the financial constraints for all program components; c) large part of the CARP balance is in the distribution of private lands due to landowners' stiff resistance to the distribution of their lands; d) LGUs' opposition on land acquisition and distribution (LAD) but generally supportive of program beneficiaries development (PBD) activities; e) significant role of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in CARP policy formulation and implementation, and in organizing People's Organizations (POs). On the other hand, the major findings on the internal implementation systems include: a) slow down of LAD process because of information or documentary problems; b) distribution of significant amount of public lands which are directly controlled by a government agency; c) dismal performance in land amortization collections; d) different ARC development planning approaches and a diversity of methods for determining the development needs of ARBs and ARCs; e) existence of overlaps between AFMA and the ARC approach; f) paradigmatic consideration in understanding the role of the DAR in implementing Sustainable Rural Development; g) neglect in the management of agrarian relations in the implementation of the leasehold component of the DAR; and h) hampered delivery of agrarian justice due to lack of financing which results in lack of personnel and low compensation for existing personnel. On internal institutional set-up of CARP implementation, the field personnel of CARP Implementing Agencies are monopoly suppliers of government services and are monopoly of sources of information regarding their accomplishments. LAD, in particular, is set-up in such a way that achievement of objectives requires the provision of sequence of inputs from various government agencies and private individuals. The sequential nature of institutional set-up allows particular field agents, whether due to negligence, incompetence or rent-seeking to hold the entire process hostage. The process is also dependent on the pacing of particular agencies.